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INTERNATIONAL REVIEW
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION
CONVENTION ON OFFENCES AND CERTAIN OTHER ACTS
COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT*
Chapter I -

Scope of the Convention
Article 1

1.

This Convention shall apply in respect of:
a) offences against penal law;
b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize
the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board.
2. Except as provided in Chapter III, this Convention shall apply in respect
of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft registered
in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on the surface of the
high seas or of any other area outside the territory of any State.
3. For the purposes of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in
flight from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of take-off until
the moment when the landing run ends.
4. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs or
police services.

Article 2
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 and except when the
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property on board so requires, no provision
of this Convention shall be interpreted as authorizing or requiring any action in
respect of offences against penal laws of a political nature or those based on
racial or religious discrimination.
Chapter II-

Jurisdiction

Article 3
1. The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction
over offences and acts committed on board.
2. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed on
board aircraft registered in such State.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with national law.

Article 4
A Contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
an offence committed on board except in the following cases:
a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent
resident of such State;
c) the offence is against the security of such State;
d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating
to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State;
e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of
any obligation of such State under a multilateral international
agreement.
* Tokyo, Sept. 14, 1963.
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Chapter III

-

Powers of the Aircraft Commander
Article 5

1. The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to offences and acts committed or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft in flight in
the airspace of the State of registration or over the high seas or any other area
outside the territory of any State unless the last point of take-off or the next
point of intended landing is situated in a State other than that of registration,
or the aircraft subsequently flies in the airspace of a State other than that of
registration with such person still on board.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall
for the purposes of this Chapter, be considered to be in flight at any time from
the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until
the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation. In the case of
a forced landing, the provisions of this Chapter shall continue to apply with
respect to offences and acts committed on board until competent authorities of
a State take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for the persons and
property on board.

Article 6
1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe
that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft, an
offence or act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, impose upon such person
reasonable measures including restraint which are necessary:
a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property
therein; or
b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to
disembark him in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other
crew members and may request or authorize, but not require, the assistance of
passengers to restrain any person whom he is entitled to restrain. Any crew
member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive measures without
such authorization when he has reasonable grounds to believe that such action
is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or
property therein.

Article 7
1. Measures of restraint imposed upon a person in accordance with Article
6 shall not be continued beyond any point at which the aircraft lands unless:
a) such point is in the territory of a non-Contracting State and its
authorities refuse to permit disembarkation of that person or those
measures have been imposed in accordance with Article 6, paragraph
1 c) in order to enable his delivery to competent authorities;
b) the aircraft makes a forced landing and the aircraft commander is
unable to deliver that person to competent authorities; or
c) that person agrees to onward carriage under restraint.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable, and if possible before
landing in the territory of a State with a person on board who has been placed
under restraint in accordance with the provisions of Article 6, notify the
authorities of such State of the fact that a person on board is under restraint
and of the reasons for such restraint.

Article 8
1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for the purpose
of subparagraph a) or b) of paragraph 1 of Article 6, disembark in the territory
of any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds
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to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act
contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1 b).
2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in
which he disembarks any person pursuant to this Article, the fact of and the
reasons for such disembarkation.

Article 9
1. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any
Contracting State in the territory of which the aircraft lands any person who
he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed on board the aircraft an
act which, in his opinion, is a serious offence according to the penal law of
the State of registration of the aircraft.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable and if possible before
landing in the territory of a Contracting State with a person on board whom
the aircraft commander intends to deliver in accordance with the preceding
paragraph, notify the authorities of such State of his intention to deliver such
person and the reasons therefor.
3. The aircraft commander shall furnish the authorities to whom any suspected offender is delivered in accordance with the provisions of this Article
with evidence and information which, under the law of the State of registration of the aircraft, are lawfully in his possession.

Article 10
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft
commander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or
operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment
undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken.

Chapter IV

-

Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
Article 11

1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat
thereof an act of interference, seizure or other wrongful exercise of control
of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft
to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding pargraph, the Contracting State
in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue
their journey as soon as practicable, and shall return the aircraft and its cargo
to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.

Chapter V

-

Powers and Duties of States
Article 12

Any Contracting State shall allow the commander of an aircraft registered
in another Contracting State to disembark any person pursuant to Article 8,
paragraph 1.

Article 13
1. Any Contracting State shall take delivery of any person whom the aircraft
commander delivers pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 1.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting
State shall take custody or other measures to ensure the presence of any person
suspected of an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, and of any person
of whom it has taken delivery. The custody and other measures shall be as
provided in the law of that State but may only be continued for such time as
is reasonably necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be
instituted.
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3. Any person in custody pursuant to the previous paragraph shall be assisted
in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of
the State of which he is a national.
4. Any Contracting State, to which a person is delivered pursuant to Article
9, paragraph 1, or in whose territory an aircraft lands following the commission
of an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, shall immediately make a
preliminary enquiry into the facts.
5. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody
it shall immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft and the State
of nationality of the detained person and, if it considers it advisable, any other
interested State of the fact that such person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State which makes the preliminary
enquiry contemplated in paragraph 4 of this Article shall promptly report its
findings to the said State and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise
jurisdiction.
Article 14
1. When any person has been disembarked in accordance with Article 8,
paragraph 1, or delivered in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, or has
disembarked after committing an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1,
and when such person cannot or does not desire to continue his journey and
the State of landing refuses to admit him, that State may, if the person in
question is not a national or permanent resident of that State, return him to
the territory of the State of which is a national or permanent resident of that
State, return him to the territory of the State of which he is a national or
permanent resident or to the territory of the State in which he began his journey
by air.
2. Neither disembarkation, nor delivery, nor the taking of custody or other
measures contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 2, nor return of the person
concerned, shall be considered as admission to the territory of the Contracting
State concerned for the purpose of its law relating to entry or admission of
persons and nothing in this Convention shall affect the law of a Contracting
State relating to the expulsion of persons from its territory.
Article 15
1. Without prejudice to Article 14, any person who has been disembarked
in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or delivered in accordance with
Article 9, paragraph 1, or has disembarked after committing an act contemplated
in Article 11, paragraph 1, and who desires to continue his journey shall be
at liberty as soon as practicable to proceed to any destination of his choice
unless his presence is required by the law of the State of landing for the purpose
of extradition or criminal proceedings.
2. Without prejudice to its law as to entry and admission to, and extradition
and expulsion from its territory, a Contracting State in whose territory a person
has been disembarked in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or delivered
in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, or has disembarked and is suspected
of having committed an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, shall
accord to such person treatment which is no less favourable for his protection
and security than that accorded to nationals of such Contracting State in like
circumstances.
Chapter VI - Other Provisions
Article 16
1. Offences committed on aircraft registered in a Contracting State shall
be treated, for the purpose of extradition, as if they had been committed only
in the place in which they have occurred but also in the territory of the State
of registration of the aircraft.
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2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, nothing
in this Convention shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition.

Article 17
In taking any measures for investigation or arrest or otherwise exercising
jurisdiction in connection with any offence committed on board an aircraft the
Contracting States shall pay due regard to the safety and other interests of air
navigation and shall so act as to avoid unnecessary delay of the aircraft,
passengers, crew or cargo.

Article 18
If Contracting States establish joint air transport operating organizations
or international operating agencies, which operate aircraft not registered in
any one State those States shall, according to the circumstances of the case,
designate the State among them which, for the purposes of this Convention,
shall be considered as the State of registration and shall give notice thereof
to the International Civil Aviation Organization which shall communicate the
notice to all States Parties to this Convention.
Chapter VII -

Final Clauses

Article 19
Until the date on which this Convention comes into force in accordance
with the provisions of Article 21, it shall remain open for signature on behalf
of any State which at that date is a Member of the United Nations or of any
of the Specialized Agencies.

Article 20
1. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States
in accordance with their constitutional procedures.
2. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the International
Civil Aviation Organization.

Article 21
1. As soon as twelve of the signatory States have deposited their instruments
of ratification of this Convention, it shall come into force between them on the
ninetieth day after the date of the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratifi-cation. It shall come into force for each State ratifying thereafter on the
ninetieth day after the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
2. As soon as this Convention comes into force, it shall be registered with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations by the International Civil Aviation
Organization.

Article 22
1. This Convention shall, after it has come into force, be open for accession
by any State Member of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies.
2. The accession of a State shall be effected by the deposit of an instrument
of accession with the International Civil Aviation Organization and shall take
effect on the ninetieth day after the date of such deposit.

Article 23
1. Any Contracting State may denounce this Convention by notification
addressed to the International Civil Aviation Organization.
2. Denunciation shall take effect six months after the date of receipt by the
International Civil Aviation Organization of the notification of denunciation.

Article 24
1. Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled through
negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration.
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If within six months from the date of the request for arbiration the Parties
are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of those
Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request
in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
2. Each State may at the time of signature or ratification of this Convention
or accession thereto, declare that it does not consider itself bound by the preceding paragraph. The other Contracting States shall not be bound by the
preceding paragraph with respect to any Contracting State having made such a
reservation.
3. Any Contracting State having made a reservation in accordance with the
preceding paragraph may at any time withdraw this reservation by notification
to the International Civil Aviation Organization.

Article 25
Except as provided in Article 24 no reservation may be made to this Convention.

Article 26
The International Civil Aviation Organization shall give notice to all
States Members of the United Nations or of any of the Specialized Agencies:
a) of any signature of this Convention and the date thereof;
b) of the deposit of any instrument of ratification or accession and
the date thereof;
c) of the date on which this Convention comes into force in accordance with Article 21, paragraph 1;
d) of the receipt of any notification of denunciation and the date
thereof; and
e) of the receipt of any declaration or notification made under Article
24 and the date thereof.
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THE INTERNATIONAL AVIATION POLICY
OF THE UNITED STATESt
I
From its beginnings and by its very nature, international aviation has been
bound up with fundamental issues of national sovereignty and with international
relationships generally. During and immediately after World War II there was
established a framework of internationally accepted principles within which
governments and airlines were to operate. The Chicago Convention, and the
Bermuda Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, laid
down a basic pattern of understandings and guidelines which for the most
part still obtains.
In retrospect, we must agree that the framers of Chicago and Bermuda were
gifted with unusual wisdom and foresight. The principles they established have
been flexible enough to allow the international industry to expand rapidly, and
precise enough to permit governments to negotiate within them. Even so, no
amount of human wisdom could have devised the means to reconcile all of the
forces that play upon international aviation. For one thing, although the industry is worldwide, one market, the United States, is overwhelmingly important.
Our large population and our relatively high income levels make it inevitable that
we will provide more passengers and more cargo than any other national unit.
But we are sovereign only over our own air space. If we wish to fly elsewhere
in the world, then we must get permission from other sovereign states. Typically,
the other sovereigns consider that rights to enter their air spaces should be
exchangeable for reciprocal rights into the United States.
Even this requirement for the exchange of rights between basically unequal
trading partners might have been fully adjusted to, had the industry's technology
stood still. In fact, however, aviation has been characterized by so dynamic a
technology that it has never been possible for the adjustment processes to be
worked out in full.
In large part because of rapid technological change, particularly the introduction
of jets, governmental operations and policy-making in international aviation
were in serious trouble in the late 1950's. By the end of the decade, our carriers
were unhappy--perhaps that is an understatement-with what they considered
unwise governmental actions, other governments were unhappy with us and with
one another, and our own policy-making and operating agencies were unhappy
with other governments and with one another. In this situation, forward movement on the governmental front was virtually impossible. Bilateral issues were
piled up, negotiations were stalemated, and tempers rose, in many cases, to
dangerously high levels.
Against this background, the new Administration in 1961 decided we had
better take a new look at international aviation. This was done with considerable
care and thoroughness. A private contractor was engaged to undertake a basic
study of policy issues and policy alternatives. He turned in a report of two very
substantial volumes. Then, an inter-agency committee, representing the several
departments and agencies concerned with aviation policy set out to frame recommendations for the President, using the contractor's report as a part of its
background material. The steering committee was in session over a period of
seven or eight months. Its internal deliberations were supplemented by consultations with industry and labor. After an immense amount of discussion and
argumentation, it agreed on the recommendations which the President accepted
and restated in his April 24 statement.
t Address by the Honorable G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, to
the New York University Air Transport Conference, New York, Sept. 10, 1963.
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I believe that the policy statement has helped greatly to clear the air and to
permit us to go forward again with governmental business in the field of international aviation. Strictly speaking, the statement does not strike out in new or
revolutionary directions. It accepts the reality that international aviation will
not be allowed to operate in a wholly unregulated environment but it rejects
the proposition that we should therefore adopt a system of thoroughgoing
governmental restriction and control. In fact it is fair to interpret the policy
statement as falling strongly on the side of giving competitive forces freedom
to operate.
After looking at the alternatives, in effect, the statement harks back to Bermuda
and to Chicago and finds the policy-makers of those days were in the main on
the right track. It restates the basic objectives of the United States policy in
terms that the negotiators at Bermuda would, I am sure, have found acceptable.
That restatement is as follows:
to develop and maintain an expanding, economically and technologically efficient international
air transport system best adapted to the growing needs of the Free World, and to assure air
carriers of the United States a fair and equal opportunity to compete in world markets so as
to maintain and further develop an economically viable service network wherever a substantial
need for air transportation develops.

II
Let me turn now to the question of organization and interagency relationships in this area.
As you know, the President has written to Secretary of State Rusk directing
him, in the President's words, "to provide a focus of leadership for this vital
area of foreign policy." The President's directive to the Secretary expressed his
wish that the Secretary take the lead within the Executive Branch in identifying
emerging aviation problems, in advising the President about them, in giving
continuing attention to international aviation policy, and in assuring necessary
follow-up actions.
In making clear the responsibilities of the Secretary in this field, the President
made it equally clear that the Department of State would be expected to consult
with and work in collaboration with the other agencies concerned. He mentioned
by name the Departments of Defense and Commerce, the Federal Aviation
Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Civil Aeronautics
Board.
There has been established, pursuant to the President's directive, a new interagency committee on international aviation policy. Secretary Rusk has made
Under Secretary Harriman the chairman of this committee while Najeeb Halaby
of the Federal Aviation Agency serves as its vice chairman.
Within the Department we have made some organizational changes, the most
important of which has been to establish the Office of International Aviation as
a separate unit within the Bureau of Economic Affairs. Mr. Allen Ferguson has
come in from the Rand Corporation to head the new Office and we are in the
process of a modest expansion of staff.
All of these I would characterize as tidying-up and clarifying actions. The
place of the Secretary of State in international aviation policy derives directly
from his role as the President's chief foreign policy adviser. International aviation
is a piece of our foreign relations and the Secretary must have a close concern
for it if he is to discharge his general responsibilities to the President.
At the same time, we in the Department fully recognize that international
aviation affairs should not be and cannot be an exclusive foreign policy preserve.
Other agencies, and in particular the Civil Aeronautics Board, are obliged by
statute to participate intimately in the development and conduct of international aviation policy. Even where there are no statutory requirements, we are

very much aware that other agencies have capabilities and interests that bring
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them into the field of international aviation policy. The task the President has
laid on the Secretary of State is to lead, not to preempt. We intend to operate
according to the spirit and the letter of the President's directive.
III
Let me take up now some of the substance of policy, in the way of routes,
rates, and capacity.
The existing structure of air routes around the world has been built up,
sometimes painfully, mainly through the negotiation of bilateral air agreements.
The United States has been a leader in creating the existing route structure.
On the whole we have succeeded fairly well in establishing our own flag lines
on the main traffic arteries of the world. I am aware that our industry, or parts
of the industry, have not always been enthusiastic about the route exchanges
that have been negotiated. I have heard it asserted that we have bargained badly,
in the first place, and, moreover, that the United States Government often has
given up valuable traffic rights in order to advance other international policies.
During the re-examination of our policy, this subject was given very close
scrutiny. We found precious little to support the proposition that we had been
out-bargained or that your Government had been in the habit of giving away
aviation interests to achieve other objectives.
Our conclusion was rather that American negotiators had done a reasonably
satisfactory job of placing our carriers on the routes that we needed to build an
adequate system of international civil air communications. Obviously, as I have
already said, the United States has always bargained from a position of being
the largest single source of traffic in the world. If we had insisted on absolute
economic equivalence in all of our bilateral agreements, we would have had very
few agreements, or routes. What we set out to get, and what we did get, is a
network of rights for our flag carriers which makes it possible for an American
traveler to go by air in an American-owned and operated aircraft to most of
the places in the world that he is likely to wish to visit.
Now, in any event, we have this rather fully developed system of routes.
The statement of aviation policy says that we should go cautiously in expanding
it. In particular, the statement warns against adding more carriers to the North
Atlantic route and against proliferating the number of carriers over thin routes.
The guidance of the policy statement is unexceptionable in principle. In
practice, it is easy to foresee that we are going to have a very difficult time ahead.
Even though the principal route network is fairly well developed, we have some
unfinished business so far as our own carriers are concerned. We also have left
over, from the past, route exchanges in which rights have been accorded but
not exercised. These are commitments of the United States and we are going
to have to honor them if we are called upon to do so.
In the case-by-case operation of route policy, we are going to be faced with
hard choices. In working within the policy guidelines laid down, we will not
have an easy time obtaining traffic rights that American carriers would like to
have and that we would like to get for them. One can predict that there are
going to be instances where carriers and government negotiators are going to
be pulled in one direction by our broad policy interests and in another by the
immediate desires and interests of our flag lines. I hope that we can find imaginative and successful solutions to the tough cases. But I have been around long
enough to expect that there will be occasions when we will have to make decisions
on routes that will not please our industry.
Next for rates: I want to say, first of all, that the Department of State does
not intend to become a rate-making agency. We do not have a statutory mandate
to substitute for the CAB nor do we have the staff or the expertise to do the
Board's job. We do have an interest in rates, however, not only because they bear
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on the health of the industry but also because international air rates bear upon
relations with other governments. I need only recall to your mind the fare
dispute of last spring to make the point that the Secretary of State can come to
have a lively concern indeed with the way in which fares on international air
carriers are established or not established.
Now the Department agreed with the Civil Aeronautics Board last spring
that the Chandler fares were unnecessarily high. We participated with the
Board in subsequent intergovernmental talks about the Chandler rate decisions.
We have joined with the Board in supporting legislation that would give the
CAB power to control international air rates. We believe that the legislation
requested by the Administration is a necessity if your Government is to be
able to operate with full effectiveness in this area of international relations.
So far as the immediate future is concerned, we accept the Civil Aeronautics
Board's judgment that lower fares, especially on the North Atlantic, are justified
in the light of cost considerations and in terms of market development. It
seems to us also that experiments with lower fares on the North Atlantic will
move the capacity problem to a solution faster than anything else. From the
point of view of our balance of payments, we would be interested in a fare
structure that would contribute to an increasing flow of tourists to the United
States. With the New York World's Fair just around the corner, now would be
an especially apt time for designing promotional fares that would facilitate
tourism into this country.
The President's policy statement deals with the rate question. It accepts the
IATA mechanism as the most practical means available for developing rate
proposals. But it stresses that our Government in accepting the IATA mechanism
is not prepared to abdicate its responsibilities for assuring reasonable rates for
the air traveler and the shipper of air cargo. We have told other governments
that we interpret the President's guidance to mean that the United States
Government will take an active and even an aggressive part in seeking to
assure that rates are in fact reasonable.
Since our own carriers have made clear that they stand for lower international
fares, there should be no difference between industry and Government on the
rate issue. I take it that we both hope and wish that the decisions taken in
Salzburg in the near future will be ones that the CAB can readily approve.
A number of European governments have expressed approval of the philosophy
of lower fares and this is a heartening sign. If our hopes are disappointed, however, then you may be justified in expecting that your Government will be consulting urgently with other aviation powers to see what can be done about
getting a more acceptable answer.
This brings me to the capacity question. In our policy review, we looked most
carefully at possible alternatives to the capacity guidelines laid down in the
basic Bermuda Agreement. We considered at great length, also, the possibility of
suggesting that legislation be submitted to the Congress to permit the Civil
Aeronautics Board to regulate the capacity offerings of foreign carriers serving
United States gateways. In the end, we recommended to the President that
the United States should continue to base its policies on the Bermuda capacity
principles. We did not recommend legislation to give the CAB authority control
over foreign air carrier capacity.
I believe that we were right. The Bermuda rules, with all their ambiguities
and all the room they leave for differing interpretations, still provide a set of
principles compatible with the objective of an expanding international aviation
industry. As for capacity legislation, I think that it would be a most unfortunate
mistake for the United States to provide an example which could be taken to
justify restrictionism by other national governments.
Much of the argument of capacity has been over the kinds of capacity being
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offered by international carriers. There has been a vast amount of discussion
about Fifth Freedom capacity and, as a further refinement, Sixth Freedom
capacity. Disputes over Fifth and Sixth Freedom questions no doubt will continue to arise, even though the jet airplane has altered greatly the condition
under which at least the Sixth Freedom question came into being. At the same
time, the more difficult and the more persistent capacity problem of the remaining
years of the subsonic jet age is likely to involve allegations of disproportionately
large capacity offerings, without regard for the freedom classification of the
traffic.
It has always been our governmental policy, and it continues to be our policy,
to insist that carriers should be given a maximum amount of management freedom
to decide in the first instance their own capacity offerings. It has been our
position that if a carrier considers that a substantial increase in its capacity will
help earnings, either on a short or long term basis, then the carrier should be
permitted to make its own decision, subject to intergovernmental review after
an appropriate period of operating experience. We have argued-and I think
correctly-that added capacity tends to bring added demand and that, in
any case, governments should not substitute their judgments for those of
management about what traffic may be available.
It would be an exaggeration to say that our philosophy has been fully accepted
around the world, even though our practice has generally been allowed. The
future, however, is likely to bring more strenuous challenges to our position.
There is an important body of opinion in parts of the international aviation
community that favors arrangements for market sharing and for advance agreement on capacity increases. I do not expect that this point of view will disappear. Rather, I anticipate that some lively discussions will be arising from it.
So far as our policy is concerned, the President's statement gives no color
of support for the division of markets or for intercarrier or intergovernmental
arrangements to control capacity offerings in advance. Our writ, of course,
does not run beyond our own carriers and our own bilateral agreements. If
foreign carriers and foreign governments choose to experiment with market
sharing beyond the arrangements already in being, we probably will normally
have only an onlooker's interest. But we are not prepared to become an active
participant in a system which we believe would have the effect of dampening
down the very dynamic qualities that have made international civil aviation
the burgeoning industry that it has been.

IV
Let me close with a word about the relationships between your industry and
Government.
I suppose that nobody nowadays would argue seriously that there should be
no governmental interest in a public utility operating in an international environment. There is a Constitutional requirement that the Executive Branch be
concerned with the agreements under which air carriers conduct their business
abroad. There is an obvious element of public interest in an industry in which
only a limited number of carriers can be allowed to carry on the business of
international air transportation.
The case for the intervention of the Government thus is perfectly clear.
On the other hand, it is implicit in our system that the decision-making role
of the Government ought to be circumscribed. Government officials need constantly to remind themselves that even industries touched heavily with a public
interest have managements and stockholders who have responsibilities and
interests too.
Unhappily these generalizations do not provide much guidance in particular
cases. When we negotiate a bilateral air agreement, we inevitably touch on the
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basic concerns of the people who manage and own our carriers. Governmental
decisions need to reflect these concerns as well as considerations of international
polity and domestic welfare. For this, there is no substitute for close communication between industry and government.
Traditionally, our carriers have been kept well informed about the progress
of the Government's business in international aviation. In our negotiations, a
carrier representative has customarily been at hand to advise the Government
negotiators. I see no reason for change in this respect. We are not always going
to agree with one another. Probably it would not even be desirable for us to aim
at constant agreement. But we do need to know pretty fully what the other
party to the relationship is doing or thinking and why. I can speak for the
Department of State-and I think for the whole of the Executive Branchwhen I say that we intend for our part to keep the lines of communication
with the industry open.

